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The DSGE model with endogenous and time-varying sticky informa-
tion in Dräger (2010) is extended by allowing agents’ recursive choice
between forecasts under rational or sticky information to aﬀect the
model solution. Dynamic equilibrium paths generate highly persis-
tent series for output, inﬂation and the nominal interest rate. Agents
choose predictors in a near-rational manner and we ﬁnd that the share
of agents with rational expectations reacts to the overall variability of
aggregate variables. The model can generate hump-shaped responses
of inﬂation and output to a monetary policy shock if the degree of inat-
tentiveness is suﬃciently high. Finally, feedback from agents’ degree
of inattentiveness to the model solution aﬀects the determinacy region
of the model. The Taylor principle is then only a necessary condition
for determinacy, and monetary policy should target the output gap as
well in order to ensure a unique and stable solution.
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1 Introduction
Models in modern macroeconomics aim at reproducing stylized facts found in
empirical data, while at the same time providing rigorous micro-foundations
for macroeconomic relations. Stylized facts regarding aggregate inﬂation
and output found in postwar U.S. data include their high persistence over
time and the hump-shaped, delayed responses to a monetary policy shock.1
However, as noted in Rudd and Whelan (2005), the New Keynesian Phillips
curve with rational expectations cannot account for these empirical ﬁndings:
With forward-looking expectations, the model cannot generate persistence
in inﬂation as shocks are accounted for immediately. It can thus only be
reconciled with empirical facts when including a lagged endogenous term.
However, while appealing for instance to habit formation or rule-of-thumb
price setting, this procedure remains ad hoc and is thus subject to the Lucas
critique.
In their models with sticky information, Mankiw and Reis (2001, 2002,
2003, 2007) propose an alternative to fully rational expectations: They as-
sume that all agents in the economy are rational, but underlie an exogenous
probability λ of not being able to update to the most recent information
set each period, due to the costs related to acquiring and processing new
information. Only when they can update do agents form fully rational ex-
pectations, otherwise they remain inattentive towards new information and
forecast with an outdated information set. The authors claim that their
model replicates the stylized facts, yielding both persistence in aggregate
data and hump-shaped responses to a monetary policy shock.
In Dräger (2010), we extend the sticky information model by endoge-
nizing the probability of being able to update to the new information set,
i.e. the share of agents with rational expectations each period. Employing
a switching mechanism derived in a seminal paper by Brock and Hommes
(1997), we allow agents to choose between costly rational expectations and
1Fuhrer and Moore (1995) as well as Gordon (1997) report strong inertia in U.S. in-
ﬂation since the 1960s. Estimating VAR models, Christiano et al. (2005) and Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997) ﬁnd a hump-shaped response of both aggregate U.S. output and
inﬂation after a monetary policy shock.
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forecasts under costless, but outdated information.2 We assume that agents
evaluate their mean squared forecast errors and switch to the rational predic-
tor once losses from forecasting with outdated information become too high.
Hence, the share of agents with rational expectations, λt, becomes endoge-
nous and time-varying. We thus incorporate endogenous sticky information
into a DSGE model with ﬂexible prices, where we simulate agents’ choice of
predictors given equilibrium time paths for aggregate variables.
While we are able to reproduce the hump-shaped response of inﬂation
to a monetary policy shock in Dräger (2010), we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant
persistence in simulated data for aggregate output, inﬂation and nominal in-
terest rates. It thus seems that also in sticky information models, persistence
can only be generated when adding either lagged endogenous variables or as-
suming autocorrelated shocks.3 In this paper, we extend the model in Dräger
(2010) by allowing for feedback from agents’ predictor choice to the model
equilibrium. As in Brock and Hommes (1997), the model is then solved re-
cursively, where the optimal share of agents with rational expectations in the
current period, λt, inﬂuences the model solution for the next period, when
agents again decide between predictors, yielding λt+1 and so on. We thus
get a dynamic equilibrium path for aggregate output, inﬂation and nominal
interest rates with recursive inattentiveness.
Allowing for feedback from agents’ switching between forecasts to the
model solution yields a highly persistent time series for aggregate output,
without assuming autocorrelated demand or cost-push shocks or habit per-
2Empirical evidence of persistent heterogeneity in inﬂation expectations and frequent
switching between predictors is given in Maag (2010) and Pfajfar and Zakelj (2009).
3A number of papers have analyzed robustness of the results in Mankiw and Reis
(2001, 2002, 2003, 2007): Coibion (2006) evaluates robustness of responses to a monetary
policy shock in a DSGE model with sticky information for both consumers and ﬁrms. The
author ﬁnds that parameter speciﬁcations regarding real rigidities and monetary policy
objective function aﬀect the result of hump-shaped impulse responses after a monetary
policy shock. Trabandt (2007) ﬁnds that results of the initial sticky information model in
Mankiw and Reis (2002) are robust in a larger DSGE model, but a hybrid New Keynesian
Phillips curve fares equally well. By contrast, comparing estimates of DSGE models with
sticky information or sticky prices, Andres et al. (2005) cannot reproduce the hump-shaped
responses even with sticky information, while Korenok (2008) ﬁnds that the sticky price
model statistically dominates the sticky information model.
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sistence i.e. rule-of-thumb pricing.4 With respect to inﬂation, however, we
ﬁnd that although the model simulation implies a persistent trend, the inﬂa-
tion series shows rather high short-run volatility. This is due to the standard
deviation of cost-push shocks on inﬂation, which we initially set equal to the
standard deviation of demand shocks on output. Reducing the size of the
cost-push shock generates more persistence in inﬂation and a higher degree
of inattentiveness towards inﬂation.
Previous results from Dräger (2010) remain robust also with feedback
from agents’ switching to the model: Agents are still found to behave near-
rationally as in Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Akerlof et al. (2000), in the
sense that they pay closer attention to recent changes in output and inﬂation
if the variability of the forecasted variable rises as otherwise losses from
forecasting with outdated information are small. In addition to our earlier
results, we ﬁnd more interaction between inattentiveness towards output and
inﬂation. Regarding impulse-responses of output and inﬂation to a monetary
policy shock, we ﬁnd that both show a hump-shaped response once the degree
of inattentiveness is suﬃciently high. However, compared to the response of
inﬂation, a higher degree of inattentiveness is needed to obtain a hump-
shaped response of output after a monetary policy shock.
There are a number of approaches in the literature related to ours. While
to our knowledge this is the ﬁrst model analyzing endogenous inattentiveness
over time, Branch et al. (2006, 2009) derive the optimal degree of inattentive-
ness by ﬁrms in a model with sticky information as in Ball et al. (2005). The
authors show that a symmetric Nash equilibrium of inattentiveness exists,
where ﬁrms minimize a quadratic loss function relating their ﬁrm-speciﬁc
price under an individual degree of inattentiveness to the optimal price given
some ﬁxed economy-wide λ. The authors assume that ﬁrms have to pay a
ﬁxed cost relative to λ2 in order to process new information. Our approach
diﬀers from theirs in that we analyze agents’ predictor choice over time and
allow for feedback of agents’ switching between predictors to the model so-
4Note, however, that we allow for interest rate smoothing by the central bank and
assume that the technology shock driving natural output ˆ yn
t follows a ﬁrst-order autore-
gressive process.
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lution. We are thus able to evaluate the eﬀect of heterogeneous expectations
on the dynamic equilibrium path of the economy.
Analyzing persistence of inﬂation with boundedly-rational inﬂation ex-
pectations, Lansing (2009) evaluates the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve
with a time-varying parameter on lagged inﬂation. This parameter is given
by the Kalman gain from a ﬁlter describing agents’ optimal inﬂation forecast
as an exponentially weighted moving average of past inﬂation, thus assuming
a form of bounded rationality regarding inﬂation expectations. The author
ﬁnds that his model set-up generates low-frequency swings in inﬂation from
expectational feed-back, resulting in a near-random walk behavior of inﬂa-
tion. Similarly, Ball (2000) presents a model with near-rational inﬂation
expectations as in Akerlof and Yellen (1985): When forming expectations,
agents optimally use past values of inﬂation, but ignore other variables that
might aﬀect inﬂation rates. This generates strong persistence in actual inﬂa-
tion, where the author notes that the model ﬁts U.S. data well both for the pe-
riod 1879-1914, when inﬂation was stationary, and for the period 1960-2000,
when inﬂation was highly persistent. Furthermore, endogenous persistence
in output and inﬂation is also generated in the DSGE model by De Grauwe
(2008, 2010), where agents can choose between simple heuristic predictors in
the switching mechanism proposed by Brock and Hommes (1997).
Analyzing the relation between professional inﬂation forecasts and those
of the general public from survey data for the UK, Easaw and Golinelli (2010)
ﬁnd empirical evidence of near-rationality and inattention as in Akerlof et al.
(1996, 2000). Assuming that the general public may absorb professional
forecasts through the media and social transmission or ignore it, the authors
report that professional forecasts are incorporated faster into own expecta-
tions when these lie below the reference value of the professional prediction.
Inattentiveness by professional forecasters is further evaluated by Andrade
and Le Bihan (2010) using the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters. The
authors ﬁnd presistent disagreement between forecasters and evidence that
new information is not incorporated into forecasts systematically, while fore-
casters also diﬀer in their speed of updating. However, the data cannot be
reconciled with a sticky information model because professional forecasters
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on the one hand seem to have strongly persistent forecast errors, while on
the other hand disagreeing relatively little.
Finally, our model also relates to the literature on rational inattention
founded by Sims (2003). Assuming that agents have a limited capacity to
process information, only a fraction of all information that arrives can be in-
corporated into forecasts. Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009, 2010) as well as
Paciello and Wiederholt (2011) present DSGE models with rational inatten-
tion of ﬁrms, solving for the equilibrium degree of inattention and analyzing
optimal monetary policy. Further approaches with rational inattention can
be found in Adam (2007, 2009). While we assume in contrast to the litera-
ture on rational inattention that agents can form rational expectations once
they pay the cost for it, our model incorporates aspects of rational inatten-
tion in that we assume agents are capable of assessing their forecast errors.
Hence, agents are aware of some aggregate information, even if they conse-
quently choose not to incorporate it into their expectations due to the related
processing costs.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: After the intro-
duction, we brieﬂy present the model in section 2. Results of the model
simulations with recursive inattentiveness are given in section 3, where we
analyze persistence of the variables, the nature of recursive inattentiveness,
responses to monetary policy shocks and the stability of the model. Finally,
section 4 summarizes and concludes.
2 A Model with Endogenous and Time-Varying
Inattentiveness
2.1 The Model
We analyze a model with endogenous sticky information, building on the one
derived in Dräger (2010). Extending the models with sticky information by
Mankiw and Reis (2001, 2002, 2003, 2007), we recursively derive the share of
rational agents each period as an endogenous and time-varying expression.
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In that sense, our approach diﬀers from the one in Branch et al. (2009), who
solve for the constant equilibrium degree of inattentiveness by ﬁrms. The
model equations are brieﬂy reviewed here and we refer the reader to Dräger
(2010) for detailed derivations.
Our model takes the form of a New Keynesian DSGE model with ﬂexible
prices and heterogeneous expectations. Heterogeneity arises because agents
have the choice each period between paying the cost for the newest informa-
tion set necessary to form rational expectations (what we term the ‘rational-
ity cost’), and using an older, costless information set to form expectations on
output and inﬂation. While aggregate information may be publicly available,
the rationality cost captures all costs related to acquiring and processing this
information into agents’ forecasts. Each period, thus, a share of agents has
rational expectations, while the rest of the population is subject to sticky
information, forecasting with information from the date when they last paid
for new information. Note that we assume that all agents know the relevant
model and are computationally able to form rational expectations, so that
the only deviation from full rationality may be the use of outdated informa-
tion. An expression for aggregate heterogeneous expectations is then derived
as follows:










where ERE and ESI denote expectation operators under rational and sticky
information, respectively, and λt is the time-varying share of rational agents
in period t. Note that the sticky information expectation operator comprises
expectations of all agents that do not update in period t, but instead use
information from some time in the past. Their forecasts receive less weight,
the older their information set is. Since all agents are computationally ca-
pable of producing rational forecasts, they switch to being rational as soon
as they pay the rationality cost in a given period. Conversely, they belong
to the sticky information group if they do not update and hence continue to
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use their information set from the previous period.
We then derive the Euler equation with heterogeneous expectations of
households, where ˆ x denotes the deviation of x from its steady state:
ˆ ct =   Etˆ ct+1 −
1
σ
(ˆ it −   Etπt+1), (2)
Under the assumption that markets clear, output ˆ yt is derived in a New
Keynesian IS curve with heterogeneous expectations, where ut denotes an
i.i.d. demand shock:





















ˆ it + ut (3)
Next, we derive an expression for aggregate prices ˆ pt of ﬁrms, assuming
ﬂexible prices and the same heterogeneity with respect to expectations as for
households:
ˆ pt =   Et [ˆ pt + ψ (ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t ) + et], (4)
where et is an i.i.d. cost-push shock. The expression (ˆ yt − ˆ yn
t ) denotes the
output gap, deﬁned as the deviation of output ˆ yt from natural output ˆ yn
t .
This is the optimal output that would occur under ﬂexible prices and fully







After some algebra, we get the sticky information Phillips curve with
heterogeneous expectations from (4), where switching between predictors in










et + λt−1Et−1 [πt + ψ∆(ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t ) + ∆et]




jEt−2−j [πt + ψ∆(ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t ) + ∆et]
(6)
Finally, the model is closed by specifying that monetary policy sets nom-
inal interest rates ˆ it according to a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing,
targeting actual inﬂation and the output gap as in Mankiw and Reis (2007):
ˆ it = µiˆ it−1 + (1 − µi)(µππt + µygap(ˆ yt − ˆ y
n
t )) + ηt, (7)
where ηt denotes an i.i.d. monetary policy shock.
An expression for the time-varying degree of inattentiveness captured by
the share of rational agents, λt, is then derived by adapting the switching
mechanism derived in a seminal paper by Brock and Hommes (1997). This
approach assumes that agents continuously evaluate the accuracy of their
forecasts and switch to being rational once the losses from forecasting with
outdated information exceed the costs for the new information set. Con-
versely, if the gains from rational forecasts are not suﬃcient to outweigh the
rationality costs, agents refrain from using rational expectations and switch
to forecasting with sticky information by not updating in the current period.
In order for agents to be able to evaluate their forecast accuracy, we
assume that some information on aggregate variables arrives continuously,
but due to the related costs agents may choose not to process it into their
forecasts. In that sense, our deﬁnition of sticky information diﬀers slightly
from the one in Mankiw and Reis (2001, 2002, 2003, 2007) and is closer
to the concept of rational inattention in Sims (2003). Nevertheless, deriving
microfoundations for the sticky information model, Reis (2006) also ﬁnds that
the optimal degree of inattentiveness is a function of the volatility of shocks
as well as the diﬀerence between proﬁts under full or sticky information, thus
using aggregate conditions to derive a ﬁxed λ.
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In line with the literature on heterogeneous expectations and also the
approach in Branch et al. (2009), we deﬁne agents’ mean squared forecast
errors as the metric of forecast accuracy. These are given with respect to the


























where KRE is the rationality cost of obtaining up-to-date information. We
deﬁne KRE relative to the mean squared forecast error under sticky informa-
tion and assume a baseline value of 50%.5 The weights ωk are assumed to
be geometrically declining and sum to one, deﬁned as ωk = (1 − ρ)ρk, with
0 < ρ < 1 measuring the degree of agents’ memory of past mean squared
forecast errors.6
Finally, following Brock and Hommes (1997), the time-varying degree of
inattentiveness is deﬁned by a multinomial logit map, deriving the probability
of choosing the rational predictor as a function of its relative desirability,
i.e. its measure of forecast accuracy V RE. This approach is frequently used
in discrete choice theory, see Manski and McFadden (1981). Since in our
model agents form expectations regarding output and inﬂation, we deﬁne two
switching mechanisms regarding the share of agents with rational output and
inﬂation expectations, respectively. This allows us to account for the diﬀerent
eﬀects of shocks in the economy on output and inﬂation and their diﬀerent
weights in the central bank’s Taylor rule. We thus get for the time-varying
degree of inattentiveness regarding output, λ
y
t, and inﬂation, λπ
t :
5Robustness of the model with respect to changing values of KRE is analyzed in Dräger
(2010). Generally, a higher rationality cost induces a lower share of agents with rational
expectations and vice versa.
6Note that we assume that agents inherit knowledge of the past forecast accuracy of

















π,t ) + exp(γV SI
π,t )
, (11)
where the parameter γ is called the ‘intensity of choice’ and measures the
degree to which agents will be inﬂuenced in their choice of predictor by its
past forecasting performance.
2.2 Equilibrium Dynamics
The model solution is found recursively over the simulation horizon: As in
Dräger (2010), we use the algorithm by Meyer-Gohde (2010) to numerically
solve for the system of linear rational expectation equations with an inﬁnite
sum of lagged expectations. The algorithm combines a Generalized Schur
Decomposition to solve for the undetermined coeﬃcients of the MA(∞) re-
cursive law of motion with an approximation to the inﬁnite sum of lagged
expectations by calculating matrices of limiting coeﬃcients. The model so-
lution is diﬀerent from the one in Dräger (2010), however, in that we allow
for feedback from agents’ switching decision between expectation operators
to the evolution of the model economy. As in Brock and Hommes (1997),
the model is thus solved recursively over time, yielding simulated time paths
for aggregate variables and time-varying inattentiveness.
Speciﬁcally, the timing of events is as follows: Starting from an initial
simulation of the model with ﬁxed degree of inattentiveness, agents evaluate
the performance of their forecast model in period t and decide whether to
switch predictors. The degree of inattentiveness is then found via the multi-




t are incorporated into the model equations and inﬂuence its solution in
the next period. Given the new solution and an exogenous vector of shocks,
the model simulation for period t + 1 is found. Again, agents evaluate their




t+1. These feed back into the model solution for
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period t + 2 and so forth.
The existence of an equilibrium with endogenous inattentiveness is proven
by Branch et al. (2009) for a model with a sticky information price setting
curve as in Ball et al. (2005). The authors model endogenous inattentiveness
as ﬁrms’ optimal choice of λ via a loss function describing expected proﬁt
losses when deviating from an economy-wide degree of inattentiveness λ. The
equilibrium λ∗ is then given as a symmetric Nash equilibrium: It is deﬁned
by the ﬁxed point of the map describing ﬁrms’ best-response function as the
value of λ that minimizes the loss function and the costs of updating deﬁned
relative to λ2. The authors show that a symmetric Nash equilibrium of this
kind exists, but highlight the fact that multiple equilibria may be present.
For the case of models with recursively time-varying shares of agents
using a particular predictor, Brock and Hommes (1997) analyze equilibrium
dynamics in a cobweb model, where agents choose between rational and
adaptive expectations. The authors ﬁnd that if a cost to rational expectations
is introduced and if the intensity of choice, γ, is suﬃciently high, complicated
equilibrium dynamics may arise. Speciﬁcally, for high values of γ, the system
is close to or has a homoclinic orbit and corresponding strange attractors. A
homoclinic orbit is deﬁned as the intersection of the stable and the unstable
manifold of the steady-state saddle point equilibrium. If additionally the
Jacobian of the saddle point at the homoclinic orbit has two eigenvalues
whose product is absolutely smaller than one, there exist values around the
homoclinic orbit for which the system has a strange attractor. This implies
a complex and potentially chaotic long-run dynamic behavior of the system.
From an economic perspective, this means that for suﬃciently high values
of γ, agents have a high propensity to switch to their optimal predictor each
period. In the cobweb model with rational and adaptive expectations by
Brock and Hommes (1997), if the economy is in a stable phase, most agents
will use the cheap adaptive predictor. This causes prices to move away from
their steady state and an unstable phase begins. In order to stabilize proﬁts,
agents will then be willing to pay the costs for rational expectations, which
in turns moves prices back to the steady state as most agents switch to the
rational predictor. The equilibrium dynamic path of the model thus consists
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of irregular switching between phases where most agents are adaptive and
prices ﬂuctuate and phases with predominant rationality and prices close to
the steady state.7 We analyze dynamic equilibrium paths of our model with
endogenous sticky information in section 3.4.
3 Results
In this section we present results from numerical simulations of the model
with endogenous and time-varying inattentiveness. We deﬁne the model as
quarterly and simulate over 1500 periods, where the ﬁrst 500 periods initialize
the model and produce lagged expectations and are dropped consequently.
Calibration parameters are chosen in line with those in Dräger (2010) and
correspond closely to the calibration in McCallum (2001), where the model
is deﬁned as quarterly. We refer the reader to Dräger (2010) for a discussion
of the parameters and of alternative calibrations. In line with Dräger (2010),
we initially set the standard deviation of demand and cost-push shocks on
output and inﬂation equal at τy = τπ = 0.03 percentage points. Additionally,
we assume no autocorrelation in the shocks, except for the technology shock
on natural output ˆ yn
t .
3.1 Endogenous Persistence
Allowing for feedback from agents’ decision between rational or sticky infor-
mation expectations, we simulate equilibrium time paths of output, inﬂation
and the nominal interest rate. As described in the previous section, these
should be understood as dynamic equilibria, which are computed recursively
over time as the equilibrium response of the model economy to shocks and
time-varying degrees of inattentiveness.
Dynamic equilibrium time paths of output ˆ y and inﬂation π are shown
together with the time-varying share of agents having rational output and
inﬂation expectations, respectively, in Figures 1 and 2.
7Note that for γ = +∞, in each period all agents choose the optimal predictor so that
the system converges to a (locally unstable) saddle point equilibrium steady state, see
Brock and Hommes (1997).
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< Figure 1 here >
< Figure 2 here >
From Figure 1 we see that allowing for feedback from agents’ switching
decision to the model economy produces considerable persistence in the time
path of output, as the share of agents with rational output expectations ﬂuc-
tuates between zero and one. This is important because it suggests that
the model is able to generate strong inertia of aggregate variables simply by
endogenizing the choice of predictor each period. Hence, it seems that our
model with endogenous and time-varying inattentiveness can reproduce an
important stylized fact, namely the persistence of aggregate output usually
found in empirical data, see for instance Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Gor-
don (1997). By contrast, most standard DSGE models have to assume either
autocorrelated shocks or the presence of lagged endogenous variables due to
rule of thumb price setters and habit formation in consumption. Indeed, we
showed in Dräger (2010) that the standard sticky information model is not
able to yield persistence either when not assuming autocorrelation in the
shocks.
Regarding the dynamic equilibrium path of inﬂation, Figure 2 shows that
simulating the model with the initial calibration yields a path for inﬂation
showing a persistent trend, but rather high short-run variability. This seems
at odds with empirical ﬁndings of a relatively high degree of persistence also
in (quarter-on-quarter) inﬂation, albeit being somewhat smaller than that of
aggregate output. Furthermore, while we initially calibrated the standard
deviations of the shocks on output and inﬂation to be equal, several studies
assume cost-push shocks on inﬂation to be smaller in absolute size than the
demand shocks on output. For instance, in what we take to be our baseline
calibration, McCallum (2001) sets τπ = 0.002 and τy = 0.03. Therefore,
we reduce the size of the cost-push shock, setting τπ = 0.015 percentage
points.8 The adjusted calibration gives a signiﬁcantly more persistent time
8We chose the adjusted value of τπ so that the calibration would yield a degree of
persistence of inﬂation similar to that found in U.S. data, while at the same time producing
a time-varying degree of inattentiveness between zero and one. A higher τπ will lead to
13Discussion Paper L.Dräger
path of equilibrium inﬂation. While the share of agents with rational inﬂation
expectations, λπ
t still deviates between zero and one, we see that the smaller
size of the cost-push shock leads agents to increasingly opt for the cheaper
sticky information predictor.
< Table 1 here >
Table 1 summarizes sample statistics of aggregate output, inﬂation and
nominal interest rates across model speciﬁcations. With the initial calibra-
tion, both output and nominal interest rates are highly persistent and close
to a random walk, while we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant autocorrelation in inﬂation
due to the high degree of short-term variation. By contrast, reducing the
standard deviation of cost-push shocks to τπ = 0.015 increases persistence of
inﬂation signiﬁcantly with a serial correlation coeﬃcient of about 0.5.
3.2 Recursive Inattentiveness
After analyzing dynamic equilibrium time paths for aggregate variables of
the model, we turn to evaluating recursive inattentiveness. Table 2 presents
sample statistics of λ
y
t and λπ
t for the two cost-push shock calibrations.
< Table 2 here >
We ﬁnd that the share of agents with rational output expectations is not
aﬀected signiﬁcantly by changing the size of the cost-push shock on inﬂation.
Overall, agents deviate between full rationality and full inattentiveness re-
garding output, while on average about 50% of agents use either predictor
for an average of 2.6 quarters before switching again.9 Regarding the degree
of inattentiveness towards inﬂation, reducing the size of the cost-push shock
lowers the mean share of agents with rational inﬂation expectations from
less persistence and more switching, while a lower τπ will increase inertia of inﬂation, but
leads agents to decreasingly choose the expensive rational predictor.




t do not deviate from their values in the previous period by more than
a threshold of 0.001 and is calculated in quarters.
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about 44% to about 22%.10 This is not surprising, as a smaller shock on in-
ﬂation will make the inexpensive sticky information predictor more attractive
compared to costly rational expectations. However, a smaller τπ also reduces
the average switching frequency regarding inﬂation predictors from nearly
3 to 1.4 quarters. Comparing these results to the ones obtained in Dräger
(2010), it seems that allowing for feedback from agents’ predictor choice to
the model induces agents to switch more frequently, especially with respect
to inﬂation expectations. The result that on average agents seem to be more
rational with respect to output than to inﬂation remains robust. This is
due to the fact that as agents know that the central bank places a larger
weight on stabilizing inﬂation relative to the output gap, they can ‘delegate’
rationality to the central bank and thus concentrate more on current output
movements.11
< Table 3 here >
Finally, we analyze the relation between agents’ choice of predictors and
the macroeconomic conditions in the model economy. Table 3 presents corre-
lation coeﬃcients of λ
y
t and λπ
t with the level and variance of output, inﬂation
and nominal interest rates. In line with our results in Dräger (2010), we ﬁnd
that the degree of attentiveness is strongly correlated with the variance of
the variable to be forecasted. In that sense, agents in our model behave near-
rationally as in Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Akerlof et al. (2000). Thus,
they increasingly opt for costly rational expectations as the variability of the
forecasted variable rises, and remain inattentive towards new developments
in the variable otherwise. Interestingly, allowing for feedback from predictor
choice to the economy does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the degree of correlation
between λ
y
t and V ar(ˆ yt), while the correlation of λπ
t with V ar(πt) rises from
about 0.4 to about 0.6.
10Note that our mean values of λy and of λπ with the larger cost-push shock ﬁt well
with empirical estimations of the overall probability of updating sticky information for
U.S. data of λ between 0.44 and 0.71 in Kiley (2007). By contrast, the mean value of 0.22
obtained for λπ with a smaller cost-push shock is closer to estimates of about 0.3 found in
Carroll (2003) for the U.S. and in Döpke et al. (2008a,b) for a panel of European countries.
11This eﬀect is reduced as the Taylor rule coeﬃcients µπ and µygap converge, see Dräger
(2010).
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Also in line with our results in Dräger (2010), attentiveness towards in-
ﬂation is positively correlated with the variance of nominal interest rates,
suggesting a strong link between monetary policy and inﬂation: As mone-
tary policy becomes more active, agents interpret this as a signal to pay closer
attention to recent inﬂation developments. However, once recursive inatten-
tiveness inﬂuences dynamic equilibrium outcomes of the model, we ﬁnd that
also attentiveness towards output is increasingly inﬂuenced by variation in
inﬂation and nominal interest rates. Although this eﬀect is smaller than the
link between inﬂation expectations and interest rates, it shows that the dy-
namics of the model become more complex once we allow for feedback from
endogenous inattentiveness to the model. Especially with τπ = 0.015, the
correlation between λ
y
t and the variances of inﬂation and of nominal interest
rates is close to 10%.
3.3 Monetary Policy with Recursive Inattentiveness
After evaluating the statistical properties of simulated series for aggregate
variables and recursive inattentiveness, we turn to analyzing the eﬀects of a
monetary policy shock. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in whether the model
can generate the delayed, hump-shaped, responses of both output and inﬂa-
tion after a monetary policy shock found empirically for instance in Chris-
tiano et al. (2005) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Since our model




ever, overall impulse-responses in terms of the MA(∞)-coeﬃcients cannot
be derived, since the MA-representation of the model changes each period.
Therefore, over 500 simulation periods, we plot impulse responses of both




t , shown in Figure 3.
< Figure 3 here >
From Figure 3 we see that over the simulation period, output and inﬂation
show both peaked and hump-shaped response functions after a monetary
policy shock. However, while impulse responses of inﬂation mostly show
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the hump-shaped pattern, the simulation for output suggests that hump-
shaped responses are relatively less frequent. In order to inquire into the
diﬀerences between responses of output and inﬂation, we approximate eﬀects
of a monetary policy shock on output and inﬂation by ﬁxing the share of
agents with rational inﬂation expectations at λπ = 0.5, while letting the
share of agents with rational output expectations vary between zero and one.
Conversely, the eﬀect of a monetary policy shock on inﬂation is simulated for
varying values of λπ, keeping λy ﬁxed at 0.5.12
< Figure 4 here >
Figure 4 shows impulse responses of output to a one-standard-deviation
monetary policy shock for varying degrees of inattentiveness towards output.
Even with full rationality (λy = 0), we see that an unexpected increase in
nominal interest rates causes output to fall below its steady state value for
about 10 quarters. This is because the model still assumes inattentiveness
towards inﬂation, which leads to an overall slower adjustment process after
the shock. However, we cannot generate a hump-shaped response of output
to the monetary policy shock. Setting the degree of inattentiveness towards
output at 50%, the negative response of output to the shock is considerably
smaller, as only half of the population learns about it in the current period,
and the adjustment process becomes more persistent. Finally, assuming that
all agents use information from the last period or older (λy = 1), we are able
to replicate the hump-shaped response of output to a monetary policy shock
found in empirical data. The negative eﬀect of the monetary policy shock
is mitigated even further and has its strongest impact in the second quarter
after the occurrence of the shock.
< Figure 5 here >
Impulse responses of inﬂation to a one-standard-deviation monetary pol-
icy shock are presented in Figure 5. Similar to our results for impulse-
responses of output, with full rationality towards inﬂation (λπ = 0) a positive
12All simulations are carried out with τπ = 0.015.
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shock to nominal interest rates reduces inﬂation signiﬁcantly below its steady
state with a gradual adjustment of about 7 quarters. Note that the strongest
eﬀect of the shock materializes in the second, period after the shock be-
cause inﬂation in the sticky information Phillips curve with ﬂexible prices is
aﬀected by inattentiveness in the previous period, see equation (6). In con-
trast to our results for impulse-responses of output, we ﬁnd a hump-shaped
response of inﬂation to a monetary policy shock already when assuming that
50% of all agents forecast with sticky information. The negative eﬀect of
the unexpected increase in interest rates is reduced considerably, and inertia
of the adjustment process is increased. Finally, with all agents forecasting
inﬂation under sticky information, the hump-shaped response is even more
pronounced: A monetary policy shock has its strongest impact on inﬂation
up to 5 quarters after the shock. Overall, we thus ﬁnd that hump-shaped
impulse-response functions can be reproduced for output and inﬂation when
all agents use the sticky information predictor, while a hump-shaped response
of inﬂation is found even for λπ = 0.5. In periods of relatively high inatten-
tiveness by agents, a monetary policy shock will thus have more persistent
eﬀects.
3.4 Stability of the Model
After analyzing equilibrium dynamics of aggregate variables and recursive
inattentiveness in our model with endogenous sticky information, we check
for stability of the steady state and evaluate conditions for determinacy of
the model.
As noted in Brock and Hommes (1997), endogenous switching between
predictors in a dynamic equilibrium may lead to complex and potentially
chaotic dynamics if the intensity of choice, γ, is suﬃciently high. This may
result in the occurrence of a homoclinic orbit with strange attractors, im-
plying that the system does not converge to its steady state after an initial
shock. In order to check for the existence of strange attractors, we run a
number of simulations, where either output or inﬂation are subjected to an
initial shock. After the shock, the model is simulated for 1000 periods and
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we collect the ﬁnal attractors that output, inﬂation, interest rates and the
shares of rational agents converge to. Figure 6 plots attractors of output and
inﬂation for simulations across a range of Taylor rule coeﬃcients µygap and
µπ and a range of initial shocks with standard deviations τy and τπ.
< Figure 6 here >
From Figure 6 we see that both output and inﬂation converge to their
steady states of zero after being subjected to a range of positive and negative
shocks. This result remains robust across changing values of Taylor rule
coeﬃcients for the output gap (0 ≤ µygap ≤ 2) and inﬂation (1 < µπ ≤
2), where we respect the Taylor principle by ensuring that monetary policy
reacts more than one-for-one to changes in inﬂation. Convergence to the
zero steady state occurs also for nominal interest rates and the shares of
rational agents converge to values close to zero.13 We thus ﬁnd that our
model with endogenous sticky information does not show any system-inherent
chaotic long-run dynamics, as after an initial shock all aggregate variables
return to their steady state values and agents thus opt for a constant degree
of inattentiveness. Hence, although the dynamic equilibrium paths of the
aggregate variables and recursive inattentiveness in our model seem similar to
the switching behavior described in Brock and Hommes (1997), dynamics die
out quickly if the system is no longer subject to exogenous shocks. Our result
is in contrast to De Grauwe (2008, 2010)’s DSGE model where agents choose
between simple heuristic predictors: The author ﬁnds that chaotic strange
attractors may arise for suﬃciently large shocks on output and inﬂation if
monetary policy is not credible, resulting in endogenous cyclical movements
of output and inﬂation.
Finally, we evaluate determinacy of the model across a range of Taylor rule
coeﬃcients. In Dräger (2010) we analyze determinacy with a ﬁxed degree of
inattentiveness given by λy = λπ = 0.5, since it is assumed that agents’ choice
between predictors does not inﬂuence the model solution. Given a constant
share of agents with rational expectations, our model can reproduce the result
13We omit graphical representation of these results for reasons of space limitations, but
the results can be obtained from the author upon request.
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in Meyer-Gohde (2009) who ﬁnds that determinacy in a sticky information
model depends solely on the Taylor principle.
Because we assume that in the limit all agents have rational expectations,
we can use the well-known eigenvalue accounting method by Blanchard and
Kahn (1980) to check for the existence of a unique and stable solution to
the model. Here, we thus evaluate the number of unstable eigenvalues across
Taylor rule coeﬃcients for varying degrees of inattentiveness towards inﬂation
and output.
< Figure 7 here >
Figure 7 plots the number of unstable eigenvalues of simulations with
0 ≤ µπ ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ µygap ≤ 2, where we solve each combination of Taylor rule
coeﬃcients for all values of 0 ≤ λπ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ λy ≤ 1 and collect the number
of unstable eigenvalues. With six endogenous variables in our model,14 a
unique and stable solution exists if the number of unstable eigenvalues is
exactly equal to the number of endogenous variables. With more unstable
eigenvalues than endogenous variables, the system does not yield a stable
solution, while with less unstable eigenvalues multiple equilibria may arise.
As shown in Figure 7, for all values of µπ and µygap analyzed here, there
exist combinations of inattentiveness towards output and inﬂation for which
the model yields exactly six unstable eigenvalues, so that a unique and stable
solution emerges. However, if monetary policy does not respond more than
one-to-one to changes in inﬂation (µπ ≤ 1), there exist also combinations
of λπ and λy with multiple solutions to the model system. Hence, the re-
sult that monetary policy should respect the Taylor principle remains robust
when allowing for feedback from time-varying inattentiveness to the model.
Nevertheless, it seems that with recursive inattentiveness restrictions for de-
terminacy regarding the central bank’s response to the output gap matter as
well: Accounting for changes in λπ and λy, a unique solution for all coeﬃ-
cients µπ > 1 exists only if the central bank targets the output gap with at
14Endogenous variables include inﬂation, output, nominal interest rates, natural output
driven by a technology shock, the output gap as the diﬀerence between output and natural
output, and the change of the output gap.
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least a coeﬃcient of 0.5 (the baseline value of our calibration) and is never
feasible if the central bank puts zero weight on the output gap.15 This result
is mostly due to the interaction between the model and the share of agents
with rational inﬂation expectations. Interestingly, as the Taylor rule coeﬃ-
cient on inﬂation increases from 1 to 2, multiple equilibria may emerge for
an increasing range of coeﬃcients on the output gap below 0.5. It seems
that the indeterminacy region increases in the form of a step function: For
values of µπ = [1.1,1.2] the model generates multiple equilibria with values
of µygap = 0, for µπ = [1.3,1.4] multiple equilibria can be avoided when set-
ting µygap > 0.1 and so on. This suggests that as monetary policy reacts
more forcefully to changes in inﬂation, in order to avoid multiple equilibria
it should increasingly target the output gap as well.
4 Conclusion
Building on the model derived in Dräger (2010), we present simulation results
from a DSGE model with recursive inattentiveness. Extending the models
of sticky information in Mankiw and Reis (2001, 2002, 2003, 2007), we en-
dogenize the probability that agents may update to the new information set.
Employing a switching mechanism from Brock and Hommes (1997), agents
decide on their degree of inattentiveness towards inﬂation and output each
period by choosing optimally between losses under forecasts with sticky in-
formation and a ﬁxed cost of updating to the new information set. While in
Dräger (2010) it was assumed that agents choose predictors given the model
simulation, we extend this approach by allowing for recursive feedback from
predictor choice to the model solution. This yields a dynamic equilibrium
path with an endogenous and time-varying share of agents with rational ex-
pectations.
We ﬁnd that when changes in the degree of inattentiveness inﬂuence the
15Note that this result depends on the range of Taylor rule coeﬃcients on inﬂation tested
here. If monetary policy targets inﬂation with a coeﬃcient larger than 2, a coeﬃcient on
the output gap larger than 0.5 might be necessary to ensure determinacy. However, since
most models assume a reaction coeﬃcient to inﬂation of about 1.5 as in our calibration,
we restrict the analysis to the range 0 ≤ µπ ≤ 2.
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model solution, simulated time series for output and nominal interest rates
exhibit very strong persistence with autocorrelation close to a random walk.
Inﬂation in our model shows a persistent trend, but relatively strong short-
run ﬂuctuations. However, for reasonable cost-push shocks on inﬂation, the
simulated series has an autocorrelation coeﬃcient of about 0.5, close to em-
pirical values for quarter-on-quarter inﬂation in the U.S. Hence, it seems
that our model with recursive inattentiveness can replicate the stylized fact
of strong persistence in aggregate inﬂation and output data as highlighted
by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) without resorting to the assumption of autocor-
related shocks or lagged endogenous variables.
All main results from the earlier analysis in Dräger (2010) remain robust
also when allowing for interaction between agents’ switching and the model
solution. We still ﬁnd that on average agents choose to pay more atten-
tion to output than to inﬂation. While the share of agents with rational
expectations is positively correlated with the forecasted variables, the share
of rational inﬂation expectations is also strongly correlated with the variance
of interest rates, emphasizing the link between monetary policy and atten-
tiveness towards inﬂation. However, with feedback from predictor choice
we additionally ﬁnd that also the share of agents with rational output ex-
pectations is to some degree correlated with the variance of inﬂation and of
nominal interest rates. Agents in our model thus behave near-rationally as in
Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Akerlof et al. (2000), paying more attention to
recent developments of output and inﬂation in times of high volatility in the
economy and ignoring smaller changes. Note that in a related model with
near-rational inﬂation expectations, Ball (2000) also ﬁnds that the model
generates strong persistence in inﬂation.
With respect to the stylized fact of a hump-shaped response to a mon-
etary policy shock emphasized in Christiano et al. (2005) and Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997), we ﬁnd that our model can reproduce a hump-shaped
impulse-response of both output and inﬂation when the degree of inatten-
tiveness is suﬃciently high. In a stylized exercise with ﬁxed degrees of inat-
tentiveness, we ﬁnd a hump-shaped response of inﬂation already when half
the population employ the rational predictor, while a hump-shaped response
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of output is only found when all agents use outdated information.
Finally, evaluating stability of the model we ﬁnd that all variables con-
verge to their steady states after an initial shock for a range of Taylor rule
coeﬃcients and for positive and negative shocks of varying size. We thus con-
clude that the potential problem of chaotic long-run dynamics with strange
attractors highlighted by Brock and Hommes (1997) does not arise in our
model with recursive inattentiveness, at least for reasonable shocks. Regard-
ing conditions for determinacy of the model, accounting for agents’ switching
between predictors reduces the size of the determinacy region. While we still
ﬁnd that the Taylor principle is a necessary condition for a unique and stable
solution of the model, multiple equilibria may nevertheless arise for some
combinations of λy and λπ if monetary policy puts too little weight on the
output gap. If the output gap is targeted at least with a coeﬃcient of 0.5, the
model is determinate for all degrees of inattentiveness. As the Taylor rule
coeﬃcient converges towards its minimal value close to 1, smaller coeﬃcients
on the output gap become feasible as well.
While a number of approaches, such as Ball (2000), De Grauwe (2008,
2010) and Lansing (2009), can generate high persistence of inﬂation and
output in models with near-rational or heuristic expectations, our model has
the advantage of nesting fully rational expectations as a special case. Hence,
the model generates persistence from expectational feedback, but includes
the option of full rationality. Agents will be willing to take this option if the



























Figure 1: Output and Time-Varying Inattentiveness across Modelspeciﬁcations
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Figure 2: Inﬂation and Time-Varying Inattentiveness across Modelspeciﬁcations
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses of Output to a Monetary Policy Shock









Response of Output to Monetary Policy Shock with τ
π = 0.015










Figure 5: Impulse Responses of Inﬂation to a Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure 7: Determinacy across Taylor Rule Coeﬃcients
Simulated with τπ = 0.015.
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5.2 Tables
Table 1: Sample Statistics
Variable Model Standard Deviation AR(1) Coeﬃcient
ˆ y τy = τπ = 0.03 0.1587 0.9776
τπ = 0.015 0.1580 0.9767
π τy = τπ = 0.03 0.0416 0.0530
τπ = 0.015 0.0264 0.4594
ˆ i τy = τπ = 0.03 0.0372 0.9361
τπ = 0.015 0.0355 0.9757
Note: Values from simulating the model 1000 times over 1000 periods.
Table 2: Time-Varying Inattentiveness
Variables λy λy λπ λπ
τy = τπ = 0.03 τπ = 0.015 τy = τπ = 0.03 τπ = 0.015
Min. 0.0005 0.0005 0.0000 0.0069
Max. 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Mean 0.5616 0.5360 0.4445 0.2198
Std. 0.4425 0.4429 0.4628 0.2751
Av. Cycle 2.616 2.608 2.992 1.413
Note: Mean values from simulating 1000 times over 1000 periods.
The average cycle length is calculated in quarters.
29Discussion Paper L.Dräger








τy = τπ = 0.03 τπ = 0.015 τy = τπ = 0.03 τπ = 0.015
Level πt -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.007
Variance πt 0.064 0.098 0.603 0.654
Level ˆ yt -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.007
Variance ˆ yt 0.310 0.307 0.016 0.008
Level ˆ it 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008
Variance ˆ it 0.108 0.103 0.444 0.479
Note: Values from simulating 1000 times over 1000 periods.
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